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Abstract: This paper aims at presenting methods 
and tools that are developed in the ISAAC project 
(Improvement of Safety Activities on Aeronautical 
Complex Systems, www.isaac-fp6.org), a 
European Community funded project, to support the 
safety assessment of complex embedded systems. 
The ISAAC methodology proposes to base as much 
of the safety analyses as is feasibly possible on 
simulable and formally verifiable system models that 
include fault models and can be shared both by 
safety and design engineers. On one hand, tools 
were developed to support safety assessment of 
Simulink, SCADE, Statemate, NuSMV and AltaRica 
models. On the other hand, formal models are 
coupled with additional models to address the 
problems of common cause analysis and human 
error analysis. 
Keywords: system safety assessment, certification, 
formal methods 
1. Introduction 
This paper aims at presenting methods and tools 
that are developed in the ISAAC project 
(Improvement of Safety Activities on Aeronautical 
Complex Systems), a European Community funded 
project, to support the safety assessment of complex 
embedded systems. 
 
Typical avionic systems studied in ISAAC are 
heterogeneous systems made up of computer-based 
controllers (e.g., real-time controllers) and 
mechanical components. Moreover, for safety and 
operational reasons, these systems are often 
reconfigurable, thus making it difficult to master the 
numerous combinations of cases and the system 
dynamics during the safety analysis activity. ISAAC 
aims at improving the classical safety analysis 
means, such as fault tree analysis, which are 
devised to cope with the system structure without 
taking into account the system dynamics. 
Furthermore, ISAAC wants to improve the sharing of 
information, which is specific to safety engineers, 
with system designers. 
 
These objectives have been partly tackled by a 
previous European project called ESACS (Enhanced 
Safety Assessment for Complex Systems, 2001-
2003). The ESACS project proposed to base the 
safety analysis on dynamic formal system models 
that include fault models and the ESACS teams 
used more specifically the following formal 
languages for modelling reactive systems: Simulink, 
SCADE, Statemate, NuSMV and AltaRica [1]. Safety 
assessment tools were developed based on existing 
proof engines. On the one hand, these tools enable 
to search for sequences of events that lead to failure 
conditions of interest. On the other hand, they 
enabled the assessment of qualitative safety 
requirements such as no single failure shall lead to a 
critical failure condition. The ESACS methodology 
and tools were applied to several case studies 
provided by the aircraft manufacturers. 
 
On the basis of these promising first results, the 
ISAAC project aims at generalizing the use of 
numerical simulable models to support a more 
comprehensive set of safety analyses. On the one 
hand, new tools are being developed to extend the 
use of formal models on their own. In particular, they 
support safety requirement allocation, failure mode 
and effect analysis, testability analysis and mission 
reliability analysis. On the other hand, formal models 
are coupled with additional models to address the 
problems of common cause analysis and human 
error analysis. In the case of common cause 
analysis, common cause failures, due to the 
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geometrical layout, are found through the use o f 3D 
models (e.g., CATIA models) and are injected into 
the formal model that specifies the functional 
behaviour of the system. Similarly, in the case of 
human error analysis, plausible pilot errors are 
investigated by coupling flight simulators and models 
of pilot mental states and operation procedures. 
Then, the emerging pilot errors are injected in the 
formal model to take into account not only faults due 
to the physical components, but also the human 
factor. 
 
In this paper, we give an overview of the 
comprehensive set of methods and tools developed 
so far and we sum up the lessons learnt after the 
application of our approach to several significant 
case studies. 
2. Building simulable formal models of complex 
system and their failures 
The first step of the ISAAC methodology is to build a 
formal system model that includes fault models with 
one of the following notations: Simulink, SCADE, 
Statemate, NuSMV and AltaRica. Two ways of 
building such formal failure propagation models were 
envisaged. In the first scenario, models are specially 
built for safety analysis purpose. So details regarding 
the normal behaviour are not modelled but rather a 
nominal abstract behaviour is modelled allowing for 
the focus to be placed on failures and their 
propagation. In the second scenario, formal design 
models exist because they were provided to support 
system functional analysis. They depict the expected 
system behaviour. These models are extended to 
deal with the failure propagation.  
The following sections show how the ISAAC 
methodology and tools support both scenarios. 
2.1 Failure propagation models based on predefined 
components 
In the first scenario, we propose to assist the 
construction of a failure propagation model with the 
use of predefined libraries of formal components. 
The library of components is a collection of formal 
models of basic system components that are 
immediately suitable for safety analysis. Thus, each 
formal model describes both nominal and faulty 
behaviour of a specific system component and the 
model granularity is defined according to the safety 
analysis purpose. 
In the earliest phases of the system design, details 
of physical components are not fixed and safety 
engineers work with simple functional blocks and 
functional failure modes, (eg. function permanent 
loss). Usually, a block offers a service (outputs) 
provided that some inputs and resources are 
available in the nominal case (see figure in section 
4.1). Only permanent failures are considered and, 
after a failure, the block no longer provides an 
output. Some other blocks do not require inputs or 
resource to play their role (e.g., source of energy), or 
they do not provide any output (receptor). The library 
contains a first family of such generic blocks. 
During the Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
(PSSA, [2], [3]), the system architecture is 
developed,  there is a greater understanding with 
regards to the behaviour of components, hence 
safety engineers take into account more specific 
failure modes. At this stage, the library currently 
contains two other families of components. One is 
dedicated to components of hydraulic systems 
(reservoir, pump, valve, pipe, …) and deals with 
failure modes such as total loss, leak in a 
component, leak propagation, … Second is 
dedicated to components of electrical systems 
(generator, bus, switch, receptor, …) and handle 
failures such as total, short-circuit, … A third family 
of components is under development to deal with a 
flight control system. 
Whatever are the development phases, all these 
failure propagation models are qualitative ones. For 
instance, inside the hydraulic library, three levels of 
fluid (empty, low, normal) are considered instead of 
a real value, that measures the fluid pressure. The 
library is currently written in the AltaRica language 
[4]. Basically, each AltaRica model consists of two 
parts. An automaton describes which failure or 
nominal mode may be activated when a failure or a 
normal event occurs. Then, a set of logical 
assertions describes the relationship between the 
input/output of the components according to the 
current modes (see for instance [5]). The library is 
implemented within the Cecilia-OCAS graphical 
toolkit. A translator from AltaRica to Lustre language 
has been developed1 and will allow the ability to 
have similar libraries written in the Lustre language, 
usable in the SCADE environment 
2.2 Failure mode extension 
In the second scenario, the process is initiated by 
the design engineer, who provides a formal model of 
the design, the System Model (SM for short), at a 
given level of granularity. Initially the model includes 
only the nominal behaviour of the system, that is, all 
the components of the system are assumed to 
behave as expected. This model may be used by the 
design engineer to verify the functional requirements 
of the system, and it is then passed to the safety 
engineer for safety assessment. 
 
The validation of the SM with respect to the safety 
requirements is performed by assessing the system 
behaviour in degraded conditions. To this aim, the 
                                                          
1 See http://altarica.labri.fr/Tools/AltaLustre/ 
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safety engineer enriches the SM with the definition of 
the failure modes, that is, a specification of how the 
various components of the system can fail. This step 
yields a model, that we call Extended System Model 
(ESM for short). The ESM is an executable 
specification of the design model in which all the 
components of the SM can fail according to the 
specified failure modes. This step of the process is 
called Failure Mode Injection, and it is performed 
automatically through an extension facility. 
 
The failure mode types to be injected into the SM 
can be stored and retrieved from a library of generic 
failure modes, the so-called Generic Failure Modes 
Library (GFML for short). This library contains the 
definition of the failures that can be attached to 
system model variables. Examples of typical failure 
modes are, e.g., stuck at (output stuck at a particular 
value), inverted (corruption of a Boolean output), 
ramp-down (decrease of a given amount at each 
execution step, down to a given value), random (non 
deterministic output), noise (a random offset in a 
given range is added to the nominal output). 
Attaching a failure mode to a system variable may 
require specifying additional parameters that affect 
the behaviour induced by the failure (e.g., the value 
which the variable is stuck at). The GFML may be 
extended to include user-defined failure modes. 
 
Figure 1: Safety task consisting of system model, 
safety requirement and injected failures. 
The scenario based on failure mode extension is 
supported by the SCADE-based, Statemate-based 
and NuSMV-based platforms. As an example figure 
1 shows a (part of a) Statemate design together with 
a safety requirement definition (on the left) and the 
injected failures (on the right). The SM together with 
the safety requirements and the injected failures 
constitute a safety task. Grouping these three types 
of information together allows for easy re-evaluation 
of a safety assessment in case of design changes. 
An application of the method to a Flap Control 
System is given in [6]. 
3. Generic safety assessment activities revisited 
thanks to formal behavioural models and 
associated tools 
We present now how to formally check whether a 
failure propagation model meets a safety 
requirement. Typical safety requirements are 
qualitative ones such as “no single failure shall lead 
to a failure condition” or quantitative ones such as 
the “the probability rate of the failure condition shall 
be less than 10-9 per flight hour”.  
Traditionally, safety analysts use a deductive 
approach to assess such requirements: starting from 
a failure condition (e.g. “function loss”) as top level 
event, they progressively built a Boolean tree or a 
diagram that catches the combination of elementary 
events that caused the top level event. Then fault 
tree tools can compute the probability rate of the top 
level event to assess the quantitative requirements. 
They can also compute the set of minimal 
combinations of elementary events that lead to the 
top level to assess qualitative requirements.  
With the ISAAC approach, the basic event 
dependencies are stored in the formal failure 
propagation model independently from any top level 
event. We use two basic techniques to exploit the 
formal models: model checking and generation of 
fault trees or sequences of events. Model checking 
enables to proof qualitative requirements whereas 
the generation tools extract from the model the set of 
causes of a failure condition. Let us give more 
details about these two techniques. 
3.1 Model checking 
Model checking is one method for the exhaustive 
verification of embedded reactive systems [7]. It 
helps to find bugs that are difficult to find by testing, 
since they tend to be non-reproducible. This 
verification approach requires having at disposal 
three elements: 
1. A system model SM. It is described within a 
framework for modelling the reactive system, e.g. 
description languages such as Statemate2, SCADE3. 
                                                          
2 see: http://www.ilogix.com/ 
3 see: http://www.esterel-technologies.com/ 
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2. A safety requirement Req. It is formally written in a 
specification language for describing the properties 
to be verified.  
3. A verification engine to establish whether the 
description of the system satisfies the specification. 
 
In the ISAAC context, the system model SM (1) is 
built as described in section 2. Whatever is the 
modelling framework, SM can be considered as a 
transition system that depicts how the system 
evolves from state to state. SM can also be viewed 
as streams of values for a period of time steps. 
 
The specification Req (2) is usually given in some 
logical formalism. It is common to use temporal logic. 
The idea of temporal logic is that a logic formula is 
not statically true or false in a model SM. Instead the 
models contain several states and a formula can be 
true in some states and false in others. Thus, the 
static notion of truth is replaced by a dynamic one, in 
which the formulas may change their truth values as 
the system evolves from state to state. 
 
The model checker (a programme) (3) is applied to 
the system SM and the property Req to be verified. It 
outputs the answer ”yes” if SM satisfies Req (the 
definition of “satisfies” depends on the semantics of 
the temporal logic [7]) and “no” otherwise; in the 
latter case the model checker produces a trace of 
the system inputs which causes the violation of Req. 
This automatic generation of such “counter-
examples” (CEX) is an important tool and will be 
applied in the following chapters. 
 
3.2 Fault tree and sequence 
Let ESM be a formal failure propagation model that 
depicts how system variables X1, X2, … evolve in 
the course of time in nominal mode or when a failure 
mode FM1, FM2, … is active. Let SR be a safety 
requirement expressed by some temporal formula. 
Let TLE be the top level event corresponding to the 
violation of SR. Then, the cause (fault-tree or 
sequence) generation analysis aims at finding out 
which combinations of FM can cause the violation of 
SR. The computation is based on the counter-
example (CEX) generation of the proof engine 
previously described. One tries to prove that ESM 
fulfils SR. If ESM violates SR, then each CEX is a 
possible cause. 
 
Thus, the analysis is done in the same fashion as 
traditional fault tree analysis (FTA), - i.e. one 
identifies minimal combinations of failures (Minimal 
Cut Sets) violating SR - but with the difference that 
traditional FTA is static whereas the ISAAC 
approach can also include temporal aspects. The 
figure 2 illustrates this difference. 
Notice that input and output variables to ESM and 
SR represent streams of values for a period of time 
steps. This makes it possible to represent analysis 
results, see Figure 2, showing a sequence of values 
for each variable. When SR is violated it is of special 
interest to notice the FM’s, which are included in the 
CEX.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 Temporal vs. static methodology 
If there is no further interest in the CEX than 
observing the FM’s – i.e. no attention is paid to 
which design variables (X) are included or to any 
sequences – the analysis result is interpreted in a 
traditional “static” way.  This interpretation can be 
seen as an abstraction of the temporal approach and 
is illustrated in the right part of Figure 2. 
Taking also the temporal information into account it 
is possible to perform a number of analyses, e.g. 
importance of ordering among FM’s, duration of FM, 
influence of system state, etc. The CEX shown after 
an execution represent one possibility to violate SR 
and therefore it is of interest to concentrate and 
elaborate on the cut set found.  
Looking at Figure 2 we see e.g. that FM1 occur 
before FM2 and we can be interested to know if their 
ordering is of importance. This type of analysis is 
done automatically by the ISAAC platforms. 
In the CEX, in Figure 2, FM1 occurs (becomes true) 
at an early time step and remains true permanently. 
ISAAC platform makes it possible to induce FM1 to 
become transient, i.e. once it becomes true it is only 
true for a few time steps, which is decided by the 
user. If analysis results in a new CEX also transient 
FM1 lead to violation of SR whereas if no CEX is 
found a transient behaviour of FM1 has no impact on 
SR.  
Another temporal aspect is to impose a "system 
state" under which the analysis shall be done. 
ISAAC platform makes it possible to define 
sequences of values for one or more of the design 
variables representing a system state. In the CEX, in 
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Figure 2, we may impose X1 and X2 to be constantly 
set to true and still allowing only FM1 and FM2 to 
become true. If SR is still violated it indicates that 
FM1 and FM2 is a cut set under the specified system 
state whereas if no CEX is found the occurrence of 
FM1 and FM2 under the specified system state has 
no impact on SR. 
4. Specialized analysis based on formal 
behavioural models 
In the following it will be shown how the approach for 
performing safety analysis in the “ESACS 
environment”, described in the previous paragraphs, 
has been reused during the ISAAC project in order 
to cover other safety related aspects, especially 
considered during the design phase, like: the safety 
requirements allocation, the testability and the 
mission reliability analyses. 
 
4.1 Requirement allocation based on SAP 
 
When designing a system, engineers have to 
decompose high level system requirements into finer 
requirements that will constrain system subparts. 
Such allocation of requirement is indeed strongly 
connected to the definition of the system 
architecture. So, in order to assist the allocation of 
safety requirements, we proposed to encode 
experts’ know-how into formal model libraries of 
typical safety micro-architectures [8]. 
The micro-architectures models exhibit elements of 
interest for a safer design: 1) structural features (e.g. 
redundancy), 2) good use condition and 3) induced 
safety properties. They are indeed abstract views of 
the system safety elements and will be called Safety 
Architecture Patterns (SAP).  
Figure 3 gives two examples of patterns. On the right 
side, one can see a “testable basic block”. The 
requirements allocated to this block are the 
following: it shall provide a health status “f” and an 
output “o” when it did not fail and it receives an input 
“i”, an activation signal “a” and a resource “r”. On the 
left side, one can see a cold spare redundancy 
mechanism made of two testable basic blocks C1 
and C2 and activated by a controller that switches 
from C1 to C2.  
C
a r
f
o
block
i
C1 a1
r1
f1
o1
C2
r2
o
cossap
block
block
i1
i2
1
2a2
f2
o2
 
Figure 3 − CoSSAP and Block 
Such patterns are often used to tolerate one failure 
(guaranteed property) under good use condition 
(derived requirements for interface system) such as:  
Activation of C1 and no failure of C1 
always imply resource for C1 
This derived requirement states that “when the 
primary component C1 is operational (because it is 
safe and activated), then it shall receive the 
resources that are necessary to provide the output”. 
In ISAAC, libraries of SAP are developed. Currently, 
the expected behaviours of a SAP are described 
within the AltaRica language whereas other 
associated requirements (good use conditions and 
guaranteed properties) are expressed by temporal 
logic formulae. Each SAP is pre-proved using the 
formal tools described previously, i.e. one verifies 
that under the expressed assumption of the SAP 
environment, the AltaRica model fulfils the 
guaranteed properties. Then the system model can 
be built as previously described. The novelty is that 
pre-defined safety requirements are made explicit 
and formal for further analysis.  
 
4.2 Testability 
 
With Testability we intend a design characteristic 
that allows the status (operable, inoperable, or 
degraded) of a system or an item to be determined 
and the isolation of faults within the system or the 
item to be performed in a timely manner. 
The Testability characteristics of a complex system 
are very important also from a safety point of view, 
especially in the aeronautical field. Here Testability 
plays an essential role both in flight, to guarantee 
safety level (switching off or reconfiguring faulty 
items or systems) and condition awareness to the 
pilots (status indication), and on ground, during 
maintenance and repair procedures. 
 
The idea is then to reuse the two basic and 
complementary strategies for the evaluation of the 
effects of failure events on a system model that is 
the inductive or “bottom-up” approach and the 
deductive or “top-down” approach, to verify testability 
related requirements. 
 
In ISAAC we set as our goal the implementation of 
two different kinds of testability analysis and namely 
the Fault Detection and the Fault Isolation analysis. 
 
The objective of Fault detection analysis is to find if 
and how faults are detected.  
With “detected” we mean the issue of a particular 
signal (or set of signals) every time that the fault 
shows (that is when the failure mode is activated).  
The Fault Detection analysis, in the environment 
described in section 2 and 3, considers as top level 
event the generation of a detection signal and uses 
the bottom-up approach in order to highlight if and 
ERTS 2006 – 25-27 January 2006 – Toulouse Page 6/11 
how a given failure mode (or combination of failure 
modes) is detected in all the possible system’s 
states.   
A sub-case of Fault Detection Analysis is the False 
Alarm Analysis that consists in analysing if it is 
possible to activate a detection signal without the 
activation of any failure mode.  
 
On the contrary the deductive approach (top-down 
approach) is followed in order to perform a Fault 
isolation analysis, that is, to see which combination 
of failure modes can lead to the activation of the 
given detection signal. 
The result of this analysis is a “causal tree”, that is, a 
tree that relates the issuing of a detection signal with 
the causal failure modes. 
Starting from the “causal tree”, one or more re-
ordering strategies (based on, for instance, the 
failure rate, the time to re-test each failure mode and 
so on) could be used in order to identify the most 
appropriate fault isolation sequence. 
 
4.3 Mission reliability analysis 
Mission analysis’ target is to determine the impact 
of degraded situations on the system operational 
modes and over pre-defined missions that define the 
scenarios in which the system being developed will 
be used.  
 
Data representation 
In case of mission analysis, not only the “system” 
has to be represented, but also the “mission”. 
 
The suggested model architecture is indicated in the 
following figure where two main “charts” are 
represented in parallel. 
Figure 4: Model architecture for Mission Analysis  
 
The first chart represents the system model.  
A system that operates in a mission can be in 
different configurations depending on the mission 
phase. The “formal” model under this chart should 
therefore represent the system configurations and 
the transitions among them. 
 
The second chart represents the mission model. 
The mission has to be represented with its attributes: 
phases, transitions among them, duration and 
requirements.  
 
An example of mission model, “Mission Manager”, is 
indicated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 5 : Mission Manager structure 
  
Qualitative analysis and results representation 
The techniques described in paragraph 3 can be 
used to find failure mode sequences responsible for 
mission failure or leading to violation of specific 
mission requirements. 
For the mission analysis purpose, the techniques are 
scaled up in order to include the possibility to define 
“observables”  (e.g. mission phases) that are then 
used in the representation of the results. 
See the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Results representation 
 
Quantitative analysis 
The failure modes sequences leading to the mission 
unsuccess with the relevant values for the failure 
rates can be used for performing the calculation of 
the Mission Reliability quantitative figure. 
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Other aspects 
In an operational context other aspects are relevant: 
like the occurrence of a particular risk (e.g. an 
engine disk burst) or a pilot error. 
 
Therefore a comprehensive environment for mission 
analysis integrates also the techniques that are 
described in the following paragraphs 5 and 6. 
5. Coupling bevioural models of complex system 
and geometric models for particular risk analysis 
5.1 Analysis of geometrical models 
Geometric installation models of systems are 
created as the system is developed. Abstract blocks 
that serve as placeholders for components are 
initially introduced with subsequent refinements as 
more details regarding the components shape 
become available.  
Particular risk models and trajectories are agreed 
with the authorities. The level of detail included in the 
models varies for each particular risk model.  
3D modelling tools such as Catia or more 
specialised tools such as IRIS are used to cohabitate 
the systems installation geometry with the particular 
risk models and carry out a collision analysis.  
The particular risk analysis type determines the 
parameters that are used to characterise each 
collision.  
An example of a particular risk analysis model is 
uncontained engine rotor failure (UERF). Here the 
critical parameters are the Phi angle (roll angle) and 
the Khi angle (angle that the trajectory vector has 
with reference to the rotor disk plane). The resolution 
of the analysis depends on the distance from the 
fragment point of origin, the criticality of the effect 
and size of the accounted fragment. A failed rotor 
fragment from the Engine affects the components 
over a range of Phi and Khi angles. The risk window 
is then plotted for each component over the range. 
Defining the risk window for each component for the 
range of Khi and Phi angle within a sub-system and 
then overlaying them would give an idea of the level 
of redundancy the system has for each fragment. 
The useful information from such an analysis 
includes the systems, structures and components 
that are simultaneously affected by each instance of 
a particular risk in addition to the energies that are 
involved; the spacing between the affected 
components, the probability of a trajectory being 
followed, etc. The relevant information used within 
the context of this project is related to the 
identification of groups of simultaneously affected 
components from all the systems that play a part in 
supplying the functionality that is stipulated by the 
safety requirement that is being analysed.  
5.2 Coupling geometrical and behavioural worlds 
We want to support the coupling of geometrical and 
behavioural models in both directions. From 
geometrical to functional world, we want to assess 
whether a trajectory computed with a particular risk 
tool is critical with respect to the system safety 
requirements. The set of items impacted by a 
trajectory is related with a failset i.e. a set of failures 
modes that are triggered simultaneously in the 
behavioural model. Once the behavioural model is 
extended with failsets, ESACS tools as described in 
section 3 can be used to check if the safety 
requirements are still valid. 
We developed tools that define failsets based on 
particular risk results computed with tools as CATIA 
or IRIS   and a table that relates geometrical and 
behavioural component names. 
Work on the reverse direction (from functional to 
geometrical world) is under progress. Two 
capabilities will be developed: Visualisation of critical 
failsets into the 3D tools, Allocation to 3D 
components of requirements derived from the 
functional world analysis. These new capabilities 
could be used to guide the installation of equipments 
into the aircraft. 
6. Coupling bevioural models of complex system 
and pilot models for human error analysis 
The main objective of coupling behavioural models 
of complex systems and pilot models in ISAAC is to 
adopt the ESACS methodology to the requirements 
of an industrial Human Error Analysis (HEA). HEA in 
aerospace generally covers a multitude of areas 
from design, maintenance through to pilot behaviour. 
The general target of HEA in this project is to identify 
potential pilot errors and the safety impact on the 
overall flight. 
 
Specific to ISAAC is the definition of a formal 
cognitive architecture of generic pilot behaviour. This 
architecture is capable to interpret/execute formal 
procedure models like takeoff or approach. 
Furthermore it is able to modify the procedure model 
based on a psychological plausible cognitive 
learning mechanism. These learned modifications 
may lead to pilot errors. Thus in the ISAAC-HEA the 
normative procedure models, also called mental 
models (MM), are extended by means of the learning 
mechanism, this leads to an extended mental 
models (EMM). 
 
The focus is on mode errors, where an action is 
performed that is correct in some modes but not in 
the present one. Mode errors lead to "automation 
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surprises", where an operator no longer understands 
what the system is doing. During the design the 
need for modes has to be balanced against the 
probability of mode errors. Generally a mode may be 
understood as a system configuration with a specific 
functionality. Modern avionics systems are equipped 
with a huge number of different modes. This allows 
the use of systems in a variety of different operating 
condition, but at the same time it becomes difficult 
for the operators to retain “mode awareness”. 
 
Lüdtke and Möbus [9] performed a simulator study 
with four pilots at the Lufthansa Flight Training 
Center. As a result they found that a subset of mode 
errors may be explained by “learned carelessness”. 
This psychological theory [10] states that humans 
have a tendency to neglect safety precautions if this 
has immediate advantages, e.g. it saves time. 
Careless behaviour emerges if safety precautions 
(like checking the actual mode before pressing an 
auto pilot button) have been followed several times 
but would not have been necessary, because no 
hazards occurred. Then, people deliberately omit 
safety precautions because they are considered a 
waste of time. The absence of hazardous 
consequences acts as a negative reinforcer of 
careless behaviour. Learned carelessness is a 
process which is characteristic for human nature 
because we have to simplify in order to be capable 
to perform efficiently in a complex environment. We 
implicitly degrade our mental model to optimise it for 
routine situations. Unfortunately this may be 
disastrous in slightly deviating scenarios. Thus it is 
crucial to consider this process in system design.  
 
Learned carelessness was modelled inside a 
cognitive architecture based on the mechanism of 
rule composition and tested by comparing the model 
behaviour and real pilot behaviour in different flight 
procedures. These trials showed that the model 
commits errors that comply with errors observed in 
the empirical study [9].  
 
Starting from these initial results the cognitive 
architecture and simulation platform are investigated 
in ISAAC with further more complex procedures, like 
arrival and takeoff. With regard to learned 
carelessness the specific analysis question will be 
answered, if during the interaction with the design 
under investigation in specified scenarios the pilot is 
likely to simplify his knowledge about certain flight 
procedures and if these simplifications may lead to 
pilot errors and violations of safety requirements. In 
ISAAC this question is tackled by simulation and 
verification. A simulation platform is developed that 
integrates the cognitive architecture, a system 
design and a flight simulation software (for the 
environment) and allows to simulate the dynamic 
interaction of these models with different procedures 
(e.g. takeoff or approach) and scenarios (e.g. 
standard profile takeoff and extreme weather and 
terrain takeoff).  
 
A procedure has to be uploaded onto the cognitive 
architecture. At the beginning of the analysis this 
procedure contains only normative rules allowing to 
always reach the procedure goal successfully. After 
each simulation run, that means after a procedure 
has been simulated and the goal was reached, the 
pilot model simplifies the procedure model according 
to learned carelessness. This leads to an EMM with 
potentially hazardous procedure rules leading to pilot 
error. After the EMM has reached a stable state it is 
translated into the formal notation of the system 
model. This enables to perform a fault tree analysis 
with the techniques described in paragraph 3 in 
order to identify all possible scenarios where the new 
procedure rules lead to pilot errors with an impact on 
the overall safety of flight. The resulting fault tree 
contains human errors as basic events and 
violations of procedure goals (e.g. the aircraft does 
not reach and maintain the initial altitude after 
takeoff) as TLE. 
 
In ISAAC extensions of the cognitive architecture will 
be investigated. The architecture is extendible, 
because of its modular structure and because it is 
based on an established cognitive core components, 
that have been applied by various researchers to 
model a number of different cognitive mechanisms. 
 
An additional benefit of having mental models and 
system models represented in a uniform framework 
is the ability to investigate mismatches between the 
two. In the ISAAC context this exploited by the 
identification of “cognitive inadequate system 
structures”, i.e. system patterns that, although 
correct, are too difficult to operate on (e.g. because 
too much and/or too complex information needs to 
be kept in the mental model during operation). Thus, 
we cannot only investigate mental models as shown 
in [11], but are also able to reveal weaknesses in the 
interaction between the operator and the system in 
terms of system features. 
7. Applicability of the approach 
The system modelling approach and the first version 
of the generic safety assessment tools presented in 
sections 2 and 3 were successfully applied to 
several case studies during the ESACS project. 
Currently, new tools versions and the extension 
presented in section 4, 5 and 6 are under test in 
ISAAC project. The lessons learnt so far are the 
following. 
The case studies are extracted from existing aircraft 
systems. Regarding, ESACS/ISAAC basic 
techniques, the sequences or cuts of failures 
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computed in ESACS/ISAAC projects seem to have 
at least the same accuracy than the pre-existing 
ones. This is due to two factors. First, the tools can 
deal automatically with numerous detailed failure 
modes. The issue is rather to find out which level of 
details is the most appropriated with respect to the 
analysis purpose. Second, the tools can also provide 
more details about the temporal order between 
events that lead to a top level event. 
Moreover, the approach really eases the dialog 
between safety engineers and system designers. 
Consider the possibility to show sequences of 
failures directly in a simulation model. This would 
help, in respect of usually huge Fault Trees, with the 
understanding of the system behaviour, providing 
evident support that the design satisfies the safety 
objectives.   
It is worth noting also that the set of case studies is a 
significant sample of safety critical embedded 
system. It includes not only command systems that 
control aircraft mechanical components (e.g. flight 
control or landing gear systems) but also systems 
that provide resources for the others (e.g. hydraulic 
and electrical power generation and distribution). 
Thus the method seams to be applicable for a wide 
range of systems embedded not only in aircrafts but 
also on board of cars, trains or space vehicles.  
Regarding newer experiments of ISAAC, they may 
testify of a wider application range. For instance, 
mission reliability analyse or the human error 
analysis require to deal with human models. Today, 
only results of preliminary tests are available. They 
shown the feasability of the new concepts; further 
results are expected to discuss the concept maturity 
and applicability in an industrial context. 
Last but not least, the project partners promote the 
new methods towards the Authorities as applicable 
means of compliance for Certification purposes. For 
civil aircraft, the Certification process, as indicated in 
the Aerospace Recommended Practice - ARP 4754 
“Certification Considerations for Highly Integrated or 
Complex Aircraft Systems”, requires evidence that 
the safety requirements and objectives are satisfied 
by means of safety assessment analyses that are 
performed during all system development cycles. 
Usually Fault Trees, FMEAS… constitute the main 
elements for this evidence. ISAAC proposes formal 
models and the associated tools as additional means 
of compliance; these means are not referred today in 
the ARP documents. 
Nevertheless, several general presentations of 
ESACS/ISAAC were already performed with good 
feedback from representatives of the certification 
authorities or in the SAE group in charge of updating 
the relevant ARP documents. 
 Moreover, Dassault Aviation chose to certify the 
flight by wire system of the Falcon 7x using the 
system model based approach. New steps in the 
certification process were defined and agreed both 
by European and American certification authorities. 
This is a first acceptance step. The next step is to 
register the underlying methodology in a forthcoming 
update of the ARP 4754/4761 document guide. 
DASSAULT AVIATION and AIRBUS will jointly 
support this activity in the next SAE comity session. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has presented a safety assessment 
methodology based on formal modelling and 
reasoning methods.  The methodology consists of 
two alternative approaches.  First, the analysis can 
be performed directly on system design models (e.g. 
SCADE, Statemate or Simulink models) and merely 
extended, by analysts, by the injection of failure 
behaviour into model variables.  Alternatively, the 
analysis can be based on formal safety models 
constructed by analysts; such models (normally 
expressed in AltaRica language) abstract from the 
“nominal” behaviour of the system and, instead, 
explicitly capture system behaviour in presence of 
failures. Both approaches allow automating 
traditional safety analyses (e.g. FTA).  They also 
allow users (analysts) to undertake numerous “what 
if” investigations, for example to investigate whether 
the effect of a particular cut set is dependent on the 
order and/or duration of failure modes in the set. 
This paper has also described extensions to the 
baseline methodology that are being addressed in 
the ongoing ISAAC project. 
There are two types of extensions. The first type 
further utilises the capabilities of model checkers and 
exploits the information contained in the models in 
order to deliver new types of analyses.  This 
includes: assistance in allocation of derived safety 
requirements based on formal safety models and 
libraries of pre-defined “building blocks” – safety 
architecture patterns, mission reliability analysis that 
utilises the structure of the mission tree in order to 
provide more accurate predictions on reliability 
characteristics of the system and analyses 
concerned with the coverage achieved by health 
monitors and properties of such monitors (testability 
and detectability analyses).  The purpose of this type 
of extensions is to maximise applicability of the 
ISAAC methodology at different stages of the design 
and assessment processes of safety critical 
systems, starting from early design, through to the 
later detailed stages of the PSSA. 
The goal of the second type of methodology 
extensions studied by the ISAAC project is to extend 
the methodology to include different types of 
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analyses in order to achieve better integration with 
what is often perceived as relatively independent 
and auxiliary analyses (e.g. CCA, PRA, etc) and in 
order to take advantage of the benefits gained from 
the use of formal methods in such analyses.  
Therefore, these extensions focus on increasing the 
scope of the models being analysed, or, to be more 
precise, by linking “core” behavioural models with 
both geometrical and cognitive models to allow 
analysis to cover the effects of common causes (due 
to the layout of equipment) and human errors (e.g. 
due to particular training procedures and typical 
operation profiles) respectively. 
Finally, the ISAAC project is undertaking a number 
of purely methodological investigations in order to 
prepare theoretical grounds for yet further 
extensions.  This includes a possibility to further 
utilise and extend capabilities of tools to analyse 
temporal aspects of the system behaviour and, thus, 
to provide analysts with a more detailed and precise 
description of how individual failure modes 
propagate and combine in the system eventually 
leading to unsafe conditions or behaviour.  The 
investigations cover not only extensions to the tools 
but also extending traditional combinatorial analysis 
methods (e.g. FTA). 
Both ESACS and ISAAC projects have included a 
variety of industrial partners – all leaders in 
European aeronautics market.  Consequentially, the 
methodology has been applied to real industrial case 
studies and the results from the evaluation were 
quite positive and encouraging. 
Furthermore, one of the industrial partners has 
successfully negotiated with the European Aviation 
Safety Authority precise conditions for using the 
methodology to produce evidence for aircraft 
certification.  
To conclude, it is important to note that although the 
project has focussed on aeronautics domain, nothing 
in the safety assessment methodology presented 
here cannot be successfully reused in any other 
industrial context that is concerned with safety 
critical systems, safety engineering and assurance. 
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11. Glossary 
CCA: Common Cause Analysis 
CEX: Counter Example 
COSSAP Cold Spare Safety Architecture Pattern 
EMM: Extended Mental Model 
ESM: Extended System Model 
FM: Failure Mode 
FMEA: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FTA: Fault Tree Analysis 
MM: Mental Model 
PRA: Particular Risk Analysis 
PSSA: Preliminary System Safety Assessment 
SAP: Safety Architecture Pattern 
SM: System Model 
SR: Safety Requirement 
